Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan


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It fully reflects the historical time, social movement of each stage of Taiwan from the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty to the 's. It presents the details of daily public life and the distress of the people in Penghu under the rule of a foreign nationJapan. The local history of Penghu Islands is the epitome of the whole historical situation of Taiwan - Dr. Ye, renowned Taiwanese historian and novelist. It is very easy to learn about the history of Taiwanese people in Chinese textbooks, but you won't learn Taiwan's authentic history, including that of Taiwan's Penghu Islands.

Louise's family history originates in Penghu, so she can write authentically about the history of Taiwan and Penghu. In describing the broader historical and social context of the various stages of Lee's life, the book also analyzes Taiwan's own evolution during the past century as a Japanese colony, a Leninist party-state dictatorship, and then an American-inspired fledgling democracy.

The book explores such questions as: Is Lee Teng-hui an opportunistic recidivist who is interested only in his own self-preservation, or is he a hero who not only propelled Taiwan into a new era, but also constructed a new national identity for the islanders? Are the multi-ethnic islanders culturally 'Chinese' or are they 'Taiwanese'?

Is Taiwan historically and politically part of 'China' or does it have its own history and identity, and deserves international recognition as an independent sovereign country? China democracy dictatorship Japan Lenin national identity transformation. Buy options. The "one China" policy has evolved to cover three issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue.

One issue area for U. The U. At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan, has continued to assert its sovereignty, seeking membership or observership in the United Nations or other international organizations. Even while recognizing the ROC government and its "jurisdiction" over Taiwan, on the eve of the Nixon Administration's contacts with PRC leaders in Beijing, the State Department testified to Congress in and that the juridical matter of the status of Taiwan remained undetermined. The State Department also wrote that.

In neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of nor the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan of ] did Japan cede this area [of Formosa and the Pescadores] to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution.

Both the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of China as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores. However, accounts of President Nixon's secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in China in reported that Nixon made promises on the question of Taiwan in return for diplomatic normalization that went beyond the communique issued at the end.

There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined. The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three U. In , while still recognizing the ROC, the Nixon Administration declared that it "acknowledges" that "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" maintain that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States did not challenge that position. After shifting diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the United States, in and , again "acknowledged the Chinese position" 25 of one China and Taiwan is part of China.

However, the communique further stated that the United States has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," while President Reagan's accompanying statement said that "the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. In , the Clinton Administration stated after its Taiwan Policy Review that the United States had "acknowledged" the Chinese position on one China and that "since , each Administration has reaffirmed this policy.

Despite these apparent similarities in U. The ambiguous formulation agreed upon in the joint communique went considerably further in recognizing the PRC's claim to Taiwan. Although the word "acknowledged" remained, the object of our acknowledgment shifted noticeably. We no longer just acknowledged that both Chinas asserted the principle that there was one China, but instead acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China. By dropping the key phrase "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain" one could interpret that we had moved from the position of neutral bystander noting the existence of a dispute, to a party accepting the Chinese assertion that there is one China.

Clearly, this was the PRC's interpretation More recently, Peking's threats to downgrade relations with the United States, unless Washington agreed to end all arms sales to Taiwan, prompted President Reagan to write to China's Communist Party Chairman, Hu Yaobang, in May , and assure him that, "Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China The use of the qualifier "acknowledged" has been dropped altogether I do not believe that anyone can dispute that the U. Let me reiterate one more time, in , we acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained that there was but one China.

Today it is U. Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State Department, at each juncture, has assured us that our policy remained essentially unchanged. In August earlier than the first public statements showed in , President Clinton sent a secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin to state that the United States: 1 would "oppose" Taiwan independence; 2 would not support "two Chinas" or one China and one Taiwan; and 3 would not support Taiwan's admission to the U.

Later, that wording was apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support. This letter reportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the "Three Noes. At the Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, the two leaders issued a joint statement which included a U. We don't support a two-China policy. We don't support Taiwan independence, and we don't support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require you to be a member state.

And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. Some questioned whether the "Three Noes," especially as it was publicly declared by the U. President while in the PRC, was a change in U. However, the Clinton Administration, beginning with its Taiwan Policy Review of , added non-support for Taipei's re-entry into the U. In response to President Clinton's "Three Noes," concerned Members in both the Senate and the House nearly unanimously passed resolutions in July , reaffirming the U.

The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the "Three Noes" did not represent a change in policy. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, , Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that "every point made there [in the "Three Noes"] had been made before by a previous Administration and there was no change whatsoever. On April 25, , when President George W. Bush stated the U. However, there have been questions about whether the Bush Administration adjusted U. But U. After Chen, during campaigns for Taiwan's presidential election in March , advocated holding referendums and adopting a new constitution by —moves that could have implications for Taiwan's sovereignty and cross-strait stability, the Bush Administration called on Chen to adhere to his pledges "Five Noes" in his inaugural address of including not promoting a referendum to change the status quo.

On September 28, , Chen started his call for a new constitution for Taiwan with a draft constitution by September 28, ; a referendum on the constitution on December 10, ; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, , that "nobody should try unilaterally to change the status quo. Nonetheless, Administration officials had concerns about the volatile course of current and future political actions in Taiwan with elections, referendums, and a new constitution , reforms geared for governance vs sovereignty, and unnecessary effects on stability, given U.

The Administration added a new, clearer stance on December 1, , when the State Department expressed U.

The Inner World of Taiwan Literature 臺灣文學的內在世界常設展

Bush also did not counter Wen's remarks that Bush reiterated "opposition" to Taiwan independence. Bush raised questions about whether he miscalculated the willingness of Chen to back down during his re-election campaign and risked U. American opinions were divided on the Bush Administration's statements toward Taiwan. Some saw Chen as advancing a provocative agenda of permanent separation from China while trying to win votes, and supported Bush's forceful stance against Chen's plan for referendums. Still, uncertainty remained about the Bush Administration's implementation of U.

On January 16, , Chen gave the wording for the two questions, saying that the referendums will ask citizens 1 whether the government should acquire more missile defense systems if the Chinese Communists do not withdraw missiles and renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and 2 whether the government should negotiate with the Chinese Communists on a framework for cross-strait peace and stability. Chen also promised that if re-elected, he will maintain "the status quo of cross-strait peace. In his inaugural address on May 20, , Chen responded to a number of U.

One issue has concerned the appropriate U. Congress has expressed strong support for granting such visits. Since , the U. In May , the Clinton Administration allowed President Lee Teng-hui to make a refueling stop and rest in Hawaii but denied him a visa. In , Lee received a visa to visit Cornell University, his alma mater.

Beijing responded with PLA exercises and missile launches in and The Administration acknowledged that Congress's view was an important factor in the reversal. Representative Sam Gejdenson organized a meeting between Chen and about 15 Members of Congress some of whom were in town for the Democratic National Convention , but Chen told them he was "unavailable. In , in granting President Chen "private and unofficial" transits through New York May and Houston June en route to and from Latin America, the Bush Administration took a different position on such meetings.

As the State Department spokesperson said, "we do believe that private meetings between Members of Congress and foreign leaders advance our national interests, so [Chen] may have meetings with Members of Congress. In , while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the Bush Administration again granted President Chen's requests for transits to and from Panama through New York October November 2 and Anchorage November Chen Shui-bian enjoyed extended transits through Honolulu and Seattle in August-September , though these were less high-profile than that in New York.

However, in May , the Bush Administration was not pleased at repeated statements from President Chen Shui-bian and responded by tightening restrictions on his proposed U. Representatives Thomas Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter on May 5, , to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, questioning the decision's consistency with legislation; possible linkage to ties with Beijing; use of "humiliating" conditions on the transits; reversal of policy despite President Bush's affirmation of a consistent policy; impact on future U.

In September , the Administration allowed Chen to stop in Guam, but he had to switch to a civilian aircraft instead of his "Air Force One" that flew him to Palau. In response to restrictions on Chen's transits, Representative Dana Rohrabacher and 14 other Members wrote a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on January 12, , calling for the removal of all restrictions on bilateral high-level visits with Taiwan. A week later, Representative Tancredo criticized in extension of remarks Mexico's ban of Chen's plane from Mexican airspace on his way to Los Angeles, a move similar to U.

In August , the Administration restricted Chen's transits to minute refueling stops in Anchorage on his way to and from Central America, with no overnight stays. For his last U. After Ma Ying-jeou won the election on March 22, , he expressed a desire to visit the United States before his inauguration in May after which U. But the Bush Administration denied his request.

The United States, with congressional backing, has voiced some support for Taiwan's quest for "international space" representation at international organizations , including "meaningful participation" in certain international organizations on transnational issues. Some advocates view such participation as preserving a democratic government's international presence and promoting the interests of Taiwan's people, while others support Taiwan's separate identity or independence.

The Clinton Administration's Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan's membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible. On May 11, , President Bush wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing that the Administration should "find opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in organizations in order to make a contribution, even if membership is impossible," including concrete ways for Taiwan to benefit from and contribute to the WHO.

On April 9, , Representatives in the House formed a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it wrote a letter on April 19, , to the President, seeking support for Taiwan's participation in the WHO. With worldwide attention on the severe acute respiratory syndrome SARS epidemic, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a speech at the WHA on May 19, , saying that "the need for effective public health exists among all peoples" and "that's why the United States has strongly supported Taiwan's inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond.

In its required report submitted to Congress on April 1, , the State Department stated that it supported Taiwan's observership in the WHA and welcomed the decrease in politicization over Taiwan's participation in the WHO due to improvements in cross-strait ties over the past year. On August 14, , Taiwan submitted instead a letter via some countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations to allow Taiwan to "participate meaningfully" in U.

Taiwan's citizens may travel to the United States for business or tourism for up to 90 days without a visa. Taiwan became the 37 th country to join the VWP.

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For implementation of domestic laws, Section 4 b 1 of the TRA provides that "whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan. Two amendments for S. Upon signing it into law P. Later, Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan H. During the th Congress , in , Congress legislated a requirement for semi-annual reports on such U. Also in , Congress passed legislation P. In January , the State Department submitted the report, saying that the United States does not support Taiwan's membership in organizations, such as the U.

In the th Congress , on May 17, , Members agreed without objection to H. Congress enacted legislation, P. Personnel at AIT were technically "separated" from government service for a period of time, raising issues about employment status, benefits, recruitment, etc. The legislation also expressed the sense of Congress that AIT and the residence of its director in Taipei should publicly display the U. In the th Congress , the House and Senate passed S. Upon signing the bill as P. On October 30, , the House passed H.

An implication of this change was the end of annual focused congressional statements and votes. In signing S.

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However, he also declared that his Administration shall construe the reporting requirement by using his authority to "withhold information" which could impair foreign relations or other duties of the executive branch. In July , the House passed H. In the th Congress, in September , the Senate agreed to S. The House also agreed to S. The House passed H. The Senate passed H. President Obama signed the bill into law P. He issued a statement of support for Taiwan's participation at ICAO, while construing the act to be consistent with the "one China" policy.

On August 28, the State Department submitted a report as required by Section 1 c of the legislation. The State Department told Congress of U. The State Department noted that U. The PRC has never renounced its claimed right to use force in what it sees as an internal problem and, moreover, has voiced more explicitly and demonstrated clearly its willingness to use force for political if not military objectives—despite its announced policy of "peaceful unification. In the Taiwan Strait Crisis of , the PRC launched provocative military exercises, including missile "test-firings," to express displeasure with President Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the United States and to intimidate voters before Taiwan's first democratic presidential election.

President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in March The PRC raised tension again in , after Lee said the cross-strait relationship was "special state-to-state ties. In February , on the eve of another presidential election in Taiwan, the PRC issued its second White Paper on Taiwan, reaffirming the peaceful unification policy but adding a new precondition for the use of force. As one of " Three Ifs ," the PRC warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely refuses to negotiate a peaceful settlement, the PRC would be compelled to use force to achieve unification.

No deadline was issued. The White Paper warned the United States not to sell arms to Taiwan or pursue any form of alliance with Taiwan, including cooperation in missile defense. Before the presidential election in , a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who was a PLA major general issued a threat, on November 18, , to use force against what Beijing perceives as the "open promotion of Taiwan independence. President Bush also opposed referendums on membership in the U.

For that election, President Bush sent two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic referendums were nonetheless targets of the PRC's belligerent condemnation. Since the s, the United States government, with a critical congressional role, has expressed the consistent position for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. Implementation of U. The TRA left the U. Section 2 b 4 states that the United States will consider with "grave concern" any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future. The TRA also excluded the islands off the mainland e.

In , President Reagan signed the Joint Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but he also stated in public and internal clarifications that U. President George H. Bush decided in September to sell F fighters to Taiwan, citing concerns about the cross-strait military balance. On March 10 and 11, , the Clinton Administration announced decisions to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, after the PRC announced renewed PLA exercises that would include further missile "test-firings" toward Taiwan and Congress introduced legislation on helping to defend the ROC.

President Clinton demonstrated that there might be grave consequences, as well as grave concern, to non-peaceful efforts to determine Taiwan's future. In April , President George W. Bush publicly stated the U. Then, in Beijing, Bush emphasized U. However, indicating concerns about miscalculations of U. Armitage added that the TRA guides policy in providing Taiwan "sufficient defense articles for her self-defense" and "also requires the United States to keep sufficient force in the Asia Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.

He declared that,. For too long, the Taiwan Relations Act has been referenced as purely a U. Under the TRA, the U. There is an explicit expectation in the TRA that Taiwan is ready, willing, and able to maintain its self-defense. Taiwan must fulfill its unwritten, but clearly evident obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act by appropriately providing for its own defense while not simply relying on the U. The TRA requires both parties to do their part to deter aggression or coercion vis-a-vis Taiwan.

Aside from the issue of whether the U. Despite the absence of diplomatic and alliance relations, U. A related issue has been whether to pursue normalization of ties with Taiwan. After tensions in the Taiwan Strait in , the Pentagon under the Clinton Administration quietly expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since These broader exchanges reportedly have increased attention to so-called "software" discussions over strategy, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.

The George W. Bush Administration continued and expanded the closer military ties at different levels. In April , President Bush announced he would drop the year-old annual arms sales talks used with Taiwan's military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan's requests on an as-needed basis. One objective was to select from a wider range of personnel, without excluding those on active duty.

Although there has been much interest among U. As confirmed to Taiwan's legislature by its envoy to Washington, C. Chen, and reported in Taiwan's media, PRC leader Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China's deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U. Policy considerations include the TRA under which the United States has based its defense assistance to Taiwan on the threat that it faces , the Joint Communique which discussed reductions in U.

On April 21, , Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified to the House International Relations Committee that if the PRC meets its stated obligations to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, "it follows logically that Taiwan's defense requirements will change. Since the s, particularly given the PLA's provocative exercises and missile launches in , Congress has asserted its role vis-a-vis the President in determining arms sales under Section 3 b of the TRA, and in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2 b 6 on the U.

During the th Congress , in early , Congress became increasingly concerned about provocative PLA exercises held the previous summer and again on the eve of Taiwan's presidential election in March with "test-firings" of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles to target areas close to the two Taiwan ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung.

On March 13, , during markup of H. The resolution cited Section 3 c of the TRA, which directs the President to inform Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and to determine the U. However, on March 14, , Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord told the subcommittee that "however serious, the present situation does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act" and that "if warranted by circumstances, we will act under Section 3 c of the TRA, in close consultation with the Congress.

Those consultations took place on March 16, In addition to examining arms sales, Congress looked closer at U. Also, Section of the act required a section in the annual report on PRC military power as required by P. The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia and other former Soviet states, as in the original House language H. Section required the Departments of State and Defense to provide detailed briefings not specified as classified to committees including those on appropriations within 90 days of enactment and not later than every days thereafter during FY The briefings were to cover U.


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Some Members in the House and Senate called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations with Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President Bush announced on April 24, , that he would drop the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine considerations on an "as-needed" basis.

Enacted as P. Section , amending the Foreign Service Act of , had significant implications for the assignment of government officials to Taiwan, including active-duty military personnel for the first time since In signing the bill into law on September 30, , President Bush issued a statement that included his view of Section on a "major non-NATO ally".

He said that "Section could be misconstrued to imply a change in the 'one China' policy of the United States when, in fact, that U. To the extent that this section could be read to purport to change United States policy, it impermissibly interferes with the President's constitutional authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs. The House-passed FY NDAA contained Section seeking to require the Defense Secretary to implement a comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan's military and to "enhance interoperability" with Taiwan's military.

The Senate's version did not have the language. As enacted on December 2, , P. Military exchanges may take place in the United States, but U. The House also passed H. Some Members suspected that Bush had a "freeze" on arms sales to Taiwan until notifications to Congress on October 3, In conference, the Senate Armed Services Committee receded on the section to require in the legislation for a Presidential report on Taiwan's air force and U.

Still, the conference report H. The bill was enacted as P. Secretary Gates submitted an unclassified study to Congress in February The Obama Administration later submitted on September 22, , the Defense Department's comprehensive, classified report on Taiwan's air power. In the th Congress , the House, on June 14, , passed H. The briefing took place on July The House-Senate agreement on the NDAA of December 10 did not include Section , while calling on the President to continue to take steps to enable Taiwan's air force to contribute to a "sufficient" self-defense capability.

The Defense Department delivered a classified report on Taiwan's air force to Congress on January 3, On April 7, , the House passed H. Navy Perry-class frigates to Taiwan. On December 4 and 10, respectively, the Senate and House passed S. Section retained the previous House-passed H. Reagan also gave "Six Assurances" to Taiwan.

The assurances, made just before the United States and the PRC issued the August 17, , Joint communique, included assurances that Washington will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, and will not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. One policy question concerns the extent of U. As Taipei and Beijing's economic relationship grew to significant levels by the early s and the two sides began to talk directly through quasi-official organizations, the Clinton Administration increasingly voiced its support for the cross-strait dialogue, encouraging Taipei in particular.

Like a bystander, the State Department said in its Taiwan Policy Review of that "the United States applauds the continuing progress in the cross-strait dialogue. At the U. In March , Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth raised the possibility of "interim agreements" between Beijing and Taipei, after several prominent former Clinton Administration officials made similar proposals.

Roth's mention of possible "interim agreements" raised concerns in Taipei that it was a proposal by the Clinton Administration to pressure Taipei into negotiating with Beijing. Roth's remarks came in the context of suggestions to reduce cross-strait tensions issued by former or future Clinton Administration officials. In January , a delegation of former officials led by former Defense Secretary William Perry had visited Beijing and Taipei, reportedly passing a message from the PRC that it was willing to resume talks with Taiwan.

The February 21, , Washington Post reported that the delegation was part of the Administration's effort to have a "track two" dialogue with Beijing and Taipei and to encourage resumption of cross-strait talks. In the March 8, , Washington Post , Joseph Nye former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs had proposed a "three-part package" that would include a clarification that Washington would not recognize or defend Taiwan independence but also would not accept the use of force against Taiwan, and a "one country, three systems" approach.

Also in March , former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had visited Taiwan and reportedly encouraged resumption of cross-strait talks. Later, on September 5, , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk reportedly mentioned "one country, three systems" as a possible approach for "one China.

In July , the Clinton Administration's stance on cross-strait dialogue culminated in the President's articulation of a new phrase: that U. Nonetheless, recognizing Taiwan's newly established status as a democracy, President Clinton in February added the U. The Administration indicated that it would not pressure Taipei to hold cross-strait dialogue, re-emphasizing the "Six Assurances" given to Taipei by President Reagan in He said that "the central question is how cross-strait relations can move from a focus on the military balance toward a focus on ways to begin resolving differences between Taipei and Beijing.

Moreover, the George W. Bush Administration started by emphasizing deterrence and approved Taiwan's requests for major arms in In , in answer to Representative Leach about a U. His encouragement of CBMs raised expectations of an active U. In the Joint Statement, the United States declared that it welcomed the "peaceful development" of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looked forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-strait relations. Campbell testified that the "Taiwan Relations Act plus the so-called Six Assurances and Three Communiques form the foundation of our overall approach.

In short, since , U. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have continued to articulate a "one China" policy in understandings with the PRC. Nonetheless, policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the early s.

Congressional oversight of successive Presidents has watched for any new agreements with Beijing and any shift in the U. Since the s, successive Administrations also have shown more explicit opposition—through arms sales, force deployments, deeper U. In other words, U. Even as the United States has opposed a unilateral change from Beijing or Taipei to the status quo, the meaning of "status quo" remains a question.

There has been no comprehensive review of U. Some said that a U. In any examination of U. Based on unclassified citations and consultations, the highlights also give a comprehensive look at significant statements and contexts in Washington, Beijing, as well as Taipei. This compilation identifies new, major not all elements in the policies of the governments. The statements also include accounts of presidential assurances.

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The three perspectives on "one China" are placed in chronological order under successive U. The texts are placed in italics. Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia [the Vietnam War] and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan , that's two-thirds of our force We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us.

I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence. As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a "two Chinas" solution or a "one China, one Taiwan" solution. Representation in an international organization need not prejudice the claims or views of either government.

Participation of both in the United Nations need not require that result. Rather it would provide governments with increased opportunities for contact and communication. It would also help promote cooperation on common problems which affect all of the member nations regardless of political differences. The United States accordingly will support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations.

Principle one. There is one China , and Taiwan is a part of China. Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement. Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.

Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan
Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan
Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan
Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan
Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan Penghu Moon in the Well: The Lives of Two Penghu Families A Testimony to the Colonial Years in Taiwan

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